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RECEIVED FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

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3	Washington, D.C. 20463		WI 1: 12
4			CELA
5	FIRST GENE	RAL COUNSEL'S REPORT	OLLA
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7		MUR: 6376	•
8		DATE COMPLAIN	
9		DATE OF NOTIFIC	
10			RECEIVED: 11/19/10
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12 13		EVER ATION OF S	OI - 0/1/15 0D4/15
14		EXPIRATION OF S	OL: 8/11/15 - 8/24/15
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16	COMPLAINANT:	Charles A. Flint, II ¹	
17		Charles Fr. 1 mm, 11	
18	RESPONDENTS:	Lori Edwards	
19	1	Lori Edwards Campaign Co	mmittee and Lori
20	· ·	Edwards, in her official cap	
21		Polk County Supervisor of I	
22		• •	
23	RELEVANT STATUTES	2 U.S.C. § 441b	
24	AND REGULATIONS:	2 U.S.C. § 434(b)	
25		11 C.F.R. § 109.21	
26			
27	INTERNAL REPORTS CHECKED:	None	
28	EEDERAL ACTAICIES CHECKED.	None	
29 30	FEDERAL AGENCIES CHECKED:	None	
31	I. INTRODUCTION		
J 1	n markobecilen		
32	The complaint in this matter involves Lori Edwards, a 2010 congressional candidate in		
33	Florida's 12th District and the Polk County (Florida) Supervisor of Elections. Specifically, it		
34	alleges that Edwards and the Polk County Supervisor of Elections Office ("Elections Office")		

disseminated voter education television and radio advertisements that constituted prohibited

corporate in-kind contributions, in the form of coordinated communications, to her campaign.

The complaint also alleges that Edwards and the Lori Edwards Campaign Committee and Lori

¹ Mf. Flut identifies himself as the Attenney of Record for Dunnis Ross, who was Edwards's opponent is the general election.

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- 1 Edwards, in her official capacity as treasurer ("the Committee"), failed to disclose the in-kind
- 2 contributions. The responses argue that the ads do not constitute coordinated communications,
- 3 Edwards, as Supervisor of Elections, is mandated by Florida law to educate voters, and the ads
- 4 qualify for the charitable solicitation exemption in the coordination regulations.
- As discussed below, based on the nature of the communications and prior Commission
- treatment of similar matters, we recommend that the Commission exercise its prosecutorial
- 7 discretion and dismiss the complaint.² We also accommend that the Companission close the file.

8 II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Facts

Lori Edwards is the Polk County, Florida, Supervisor of Elections, an elected, non-partisan position that she has held since 2000. In 2010, Edwards was also the Democratic nominee for the congressional seat that represents most of Polk County and portions of Hillsborough and Osceola Counties. Polk County is an incorporated entity. The Supervisor of Elections position was not on the 2010 ballot.

Beginning August 11, 2010, and up to the August 24, 2010, primary election, the Elections Office disseminated radio and television advertisements informing voters about the upcoming election and emonaraging them to vote. See Elections Office Response Attachsnents, Transcripts of Ads. The ads provided basic information about the three ways to vote – at the polls, absentee voting, and early voting – and relevant dates and times. See id. Some ads gave specific early voting locations and reminded voters to bring photo identification. Id. Some ads mentioned that there were "important races" on the ballot, and one included the line, "If you

² One day after sending the complaint, the complainant requested that the complaint be disregarded. See Letter from Charles A. Flint, II, to Christopher Hughey, dated September 15, 2010. CELA informed the complainant that the Commission is empowered to review a complaint properly filed with it and to take action that it deems appropriate under the Arct. A request to withdraw a complaint will not prevent the Commission from taking appropriate action. See Letter from CELA to Mr. Flint, dated September 24, 2010.

- don't vote, they can't hear you." Id. Edwards speaks in all of the advertisements and identifies
- 2 herself by name and as the Supervisor of Elections. Id. In the television ad for which we have a
- 3 video, Edwards appears and her name is displayed at the beginning and at the end for a total of
- 4 approximately 10 seconds of a 30-second ad. See http://goo.gl/9SYbg. She speaks throughout
- 5 the ad. Id.
- 6 Edwards and the Committee ("Edwards") and the Elections Office respond that Florida
- 7 law and regulations require Edwards to give non-partisan and unbiased information to votess.
- 8 Edwards Response at 2; Elections Office Response at 2. Specifically, Edwards cites to Florida
- 9 Department of State, Division of Elections Rules 1S-2.033(4)(b)(2009), which states: "A county
- supervisor of elections shall: ... Participate in available, radio, television and print programs and
- interviews, in both general and minority media outlets, to provide voting information."
- Edwards and the Elections Office maintain that past "public service announcements"
- 13 ("PSAs") have been similar or identical to the 2010 ads and that they spent the same amount of
- funds in 2010 as in past years. Edwards Response at 2, Elections Office Response at 1-2.
- 15 Further, the Elections Office asserts that the ads were not created for the purpose of influencing
- the election or concerning campaign matters. Elections Office Response at 2. According to the
- 17 Elections Office, the ads cost about \$11,000. Id at 2. Edwards, in a news interview, said the ads
- 18 cost \$14,500. See Complaint, Exhibit 7.

B. Legal Analysis

- The complaint alleges that the ads constitute coordinated communications because they
- 21 meet all three prongs of the Commission's coordination regulations and, thus, resulted in the
- 22 Elections Office making prohibited corporate in-kind contributions to Edwards and the
- 23 Committee totaling \$14,500. Polk County's incorporated status is the basis for complainant's

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Id

- allegation that the Elections Office made, and Edwards and the Committee accepted, prohibited
- 2 corporate in-kind contributions. The complaint also alleges that Edwards and the Committee
- 3 failed to report the in-kind contributions.
- 4 Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("the Act"), no person
- 5 may make a contribution, including an in-kind contribution, to a candidate and his authorized
- 6 political committee with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate,
- 7 exceeds \$2,400. 2 U.S.C. § 441s(a)(1)(A) (2010 election cycle limit); see 2 U.S.C.
- 8 § 431(8)(A)(i), 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1) (defining "contribution"). Moreover, corporations are
- 9 prohibited from making any federal political contributions. 2 U.S.C. § 441b.

The Act defines in-kind contributions as, *inter alia*, expenditures by any person "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents" 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). The Commission's regulations provide a three-prong test to determine whether a communication is coordinated: (1) payment by a third party; (2) satisfaction of one of four "content" standards; and (3) satisfaction of one of six "conduct" standards. *See* 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a).³ All three prongs of the test must be satisfied to support a conclusion that a coordinated communication occurred.

The payment prong of the coordination regulation requires that the cammunication be paid for, in whole or in part, by a person other than the federal candidate or the candidate's authorized committee. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(1). Edwards, relying on Advisory Opinion 2009-26 (Coulson), argues that this prong is not satisfied because Edwards paid for the communication

The activity at issue took place before the effective date of the most recent changes to the coordination regulations. See Explanation and Justification on Coordinated Communications, 75 Fed. Reg. 55947 et seq. (Sept. 15, 2010) (adding, inter alia, new nontent standard and safe harbor; affective Dec. 1, 2810). Our analysis would be the same under the new regulations.

- in her role as the Elections Office Supervisor. Edwards Response at 3. Thus, Edwards argues
- 2 that the communications were not paid for by a person other than the candidate. Id.
- In AO 2009-26, Coulson, an Illinois State Representative and federal candidate, asked
- 4 whether she could pay for certain mailers and events with her state campaign committee funds or
- 5 funds from a State Office Account. The State Office Account is an office allowance given to
- 6 Illinois state legislators for the purpose of defraying official office, personnel, and constituent
- 7 services expenses. AO 2009-26 at 2 (citing Illinois statute). The Commission advised that
- 8 Coulson could pay for the mailers with either account and that the mailers would not be
- 9 considered coordinated communications because the payment prong was not met. Id. at 7-8.
- 10 The Commission concluded that Coulson and her agents, not another person, would be paying
- for the communications. Id. at.8. See also MUR 6207 (DeSaulnier Factual and Legal Analysis
- 12 at 7) (payment prong not satisfied because candidate's state committee account paid for the
- 13 communications).
- The Edwards communications, on the other hand, do not appear to have been paid with
- an officeholder's discretionary "office allowance" but rather with official government office
- 16 funds. Similarly, in MUR 5815 (Madrid), the Commission found reason to believe that the State
- 17 of New Mexico's payment for a mailer dissuminated by Attorney General/federal candidate
- 18 Madrid satisfied the payment prong. Thus, the payment prong appears to be satisfied here.
- The second prong, the content standard, is satisfied if, among other things, the
- 20 communication is an electioneering communication, which is defined as a broadcast
- 21 advertisement that clearly identifies a federal candidate and is targeted to the relevant electorate
- 22 30 days before a primary election. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.29, 109.21(c)(1). "Clearly identified"

⁴ Abser an innestigation, she Commission sook no further nation against Madrid because the communication at issue did not satisfy the conduct prong. See MUR 5815, General Counsel's Report #2.

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- 1 means that the name of the candidate involved appears, a photograph or drawing of the candidate
- 2 appears, or the identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous reference. 2 U.S.C.
- 3 § 431(18). The ads here were broadcast on television and radio fewer than 30 days before the
- 4 primary election in Polk County, which includes most of the 12th Congressional District.
- 5 Moreover, the ads identify Edwards by name and, in the case of the television ads, by image.
- 6 See MUR 5815 (Madrid) (Commission found reason to believe candidate's name and photograph
- 7 clearly identified a federal candidate but later took as further action un basis af conduct prong);
- 8 see also AO 2009-26 (Contagn) (Commission stated that a postcard nontaining the namidate's
- 9 name and photograph and state office title "clearly identifies a federal candidate" in 2 U.S.C.
- 10 § 441 i(f) analysis). Thus, the ads appear to satisfy the content prong.

The conduct prong of the coordination test is satisfied if, among other things: (1) the communication is created, produced or distributed at the request or suggestion of a candidate or authorized committee, or the communication is created, produced, or distributed at the suggestion of the person paying for the communication and the candidate or authorized committee assents to the suggestion; (2) the candidate or authorized committee is materially involved in decisions regarding the content, intended audience, means or mode of communication; or (3) there is substantial discussion about the communication between the person paying for the communication and the candidate or the authorized committee. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1)-(3).

Edwards is in charge of the Elections Office that produced and disseminated the ads, and she was likely materially involved in decisions regarding the content, which included her image and speech, the distribution of the ads, and the intended audience. She appears to have made decisions about whether or not to run the ads. See email from Lori Edwards to Neil P. Reiff

- dated October 6, 2010, and attached to Edwards's designation of counsel ("We had planned an
- 2 additional run of the voter education ads for the upcoming election. Am I correct that I should
- 3 cancel those immediately?"). Moreover, although the Elections Office states that there was no
- 4 contact between it and Edwards's campaign or staff regarding the ads, it does not say that
- 5 Edwards herself was not involved. See Elections Office Response at 2; Affidavit of Judy
- 6 Walker. Thus, it appears that the conduct prong is satisfied.
- 7 Edwards and the Committee argue that the PSAs are exempt under 11 C.F.R.
- § 109.21(g)(2), the safe harbor for charitable solicitations. That exemption provides that a public
- 9 communication in which a federal candidate solicits funds for another candidate, a political
- committee, or a 501(c) group is not a coordinated communication as long as the public
- communication does not promote, support, attack or oppose the soliciting candidate or an
- opponent of that candidate. Edwards cites to Advisory Opinion 2006-10 (EchoStar) to argue that
- there need not be a solicitation for the exemption to apply because the sample ad attached to the
- 14 EchoStar AO is an educational PSA to raise awareness about women and heart disease.
- The AO itself, however, discusses PSAs that solicited for 501(c) organizations. By
- 16 contrast, Polk County is not a 501(c) group, and the PSAs are not solicitations. Therefore, the
- 17 charitable solicitation exemption dues not spolly to the Elections Office ads. See, e.g., MUR
- 18 6020 (Pehrsi) (Statement of Rossons of Walther, Petersen, Bauerly, Hunter and McGahn at 5,
- 19 n.4) (exemption not applicable because 501(c) group's ads did not solicit funds).
- Notwithstanding that the Edwards ads appear to be coordinated communications under
- 21 the Commission's regulations, and no safe harbor applies, we believe that the Commission
- 22 should exercise its prosecutorial discretion and dismiss this matter due to the nature of the
- 23 communications at issue. Here, Edwards and the Elections Office disseminated voter education

- PSAs that strictly adhered to Edwards's official duties as Supervisor of Elections. Moreover, 1 Florida law requires that the Supervisor engage in such activities, and none of Edwards's 2 statements promotes or even mentions her candidacy for federal office. Indeed, the content of 3 her PSAs appears to be less candidate-focused than another matter that the Commission 4 dismissed involving an officeholder who made communications while simultaneously running 5 for federal office. In MUR 5770 (Laffey), City of Cranston Mayor and federal Senate candidate 6 7 Laffuy mailed a cover letter along with yearly property tax bills to city instalents that, emeng 8 other things, listed the accomplishments the City achieved while he was Mayer. Although the 9 letter arguably constituted a coordinated communication, the Commission exercised its 10 prosecutorial discretion and dismissed the matter, citing the nature of the communication and 11 low dollar amount involved (\$3,366). See MUR 5770 (Statement of Reasons). By contrast, 12 Edwards did not discuss her accomplishments in the PSAs as Laffey did in his letter. Instead, 13 the PSA squarely focuses on her official duties as mandated by Florida law. But see MUR 5815 14 (Madrid) (Commission found reason to believe that public information mailer regarding suspected meth labs sent by Attorney General/House candidate Madrid constituted a coordinated 15 16 communication and authorized an investigation; after investigation, the Commission found conduct prong not satisfied and took no further antity). 17 Recantly, in MUR 6020 (Peloni), the Commission determined in a similar case that even 18 if a 501(c) group's advertisement featuring then-House Speaker and candidate Nancy Pelosi and 19 former Speaker Newt Gingrich satisfied the Commission's coordination standard, the exercise of 20 prosecutorial discretion warranted a dismissal. MUR 6020 (Pelosi) (Statement of Reasons of 21 Walther, Petersen, Bauerly, Hunter and McGahn). The Commission noted that the respondent 22
- chose Pelosi and Gingrich for the ad to be humorous and show bipartisanship, and the purpose of

- the ads was to further the 501(c) group's goal of focusing public attention on the policy issue of
- 2 climate change, not on Pelosi's role as a candidate. *Id.* at 5-6. See also MUR 6207 (DeSaulnier)
- 3 (Commission exercised prosecutorial discretion and dismissed allegations that state
- 4 senator/federal candidate DeSaulnier violated 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(e) and (f) by sending a Health
- 5 Services Guide to constituents that discussed local health resources and national health care
- 6 reform).5

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- 7 Here, there are a number of factors supporting dismissal of this matter. The Elections
- 8 Office has apparently prepared "similar or identical" ads in the past. The purposes of the ads
- 9 appear to be to inform voters about voting locations, times, identification requirements, and early
- voting/absentee voting options, and to encourage participation. The ads do not focus on
- 11 Edwards's role as a federal candidate and do not appear to contain any electoral content
- 12 regarding her candidacy. Although she is not required to appear in the ads herself, a state
- 13 regulation requires Edwards, as the Supervisor of Elections, to educate voters through "available
- radio, television and print programs" to provide voting information. Under these circumstances,
- we recommend that the Commission exercise its prosecutorial discretion, dismiss the complaint
- in this matter, and close the file. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Dismiss the alterations that Lori Edwards violated 2 U.S.C. § 441b.

We also considered the effect of a Sertion 461i(e) analysis on this matter, but we believe the Elections Office ads were not in connection with Edwards's federal election, so 441i(e) would not be applicable. Edwards did not solicit contributions, the ads did not expressly advocate for or against anyone, and Edwards was performing her official officeholder duties. See AO 2009-26 at 5-6 (Coulson) (senior fair not in connection with a federal election because candidate will not solicit contributions, no information about participants will be provided to candidate's committee, there will be no express advocacy of candidate's election or defeat of opponents, and no "federal election activity" as defined in the Commission's statutes and negulations will occur).

In addition, we assuidted whether the veter edention PSAs should have contained a disclaimer and been reported as elections communications by the Elections Office. For the same reasons we set forth is the coordination analysis, we do not eccommend that the Commission pursue this further.

1 2 3	2.	Dismiss the allegations that Lori Edwards Campaign Committee and Lori Edwards, in her official capacity as treasurer, violated 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(b) and 441b.		
4 5 6	3.	Dismiss the allegations that the Polk County Supervisor of Elections Office violated 2 U.S.C. § 441b.		
7 8 9	4.	Approve the attached Factual and Legal Analyses.		
10 11	5.	Approve the appropriate letters.		
12 13	6.	Close the file.		
14 15			Christopher Hughey Acting General Counsel	
16 17				
18 19	2/22/	BY:	Steple Jue	
20 21	Date		Stephen Gura Deputy Associate General Counsel for	
22 23			Enforcement	
24 25			A A SU	
26 27			Roy Q. Luckett	
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30 31			900 (P.J.	
32 33			Elena Paoli	
34 35			Attorney	
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